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Abstract: War is an organized, armed, and often prolonged conflict that is carried on between states, 
nations or other parties. Every war instance includes some basic components like rising conditions, 
battlespace, weapons, strategy, tactics, and consequences. Recent developments in the information 
and communication technologies have brought about changes on the nature of war. As a 
consequence of this change, cyberwar became the new form of war. In this new form, the new 
battlespace is cyber space and the contemporary weapons are constantly being renovated viruses, 
worms, trojans, denial-of-service, botnets, and advanced persistent threat. 
In this work, we present recent cyberwar spectrum along with its analysis. The spectrum is composed 
of the Estonia Attack, Georgia Attack, Operation Aurora, and Stuxnet Worm cases. The methodology 
for analysis is to identify reasons, timeline, effects, responses, and evaluation of each individual case. 
Moreover, we try to enumerate the fundamental war components for each incident. The analysis 
results put evidences to the evolution of the weapons into some new forms such as advanced 
persistent threat. Another outcome of the analysis is that when approaching to the end, confidentiality 
and integrity attributes of information are being compromised in addition to the availability. Another 
important observation is that in the last two cases, the responsive actions were not possible due to 
the lack of the identities of the offending parties. Thus, attribution appears as a significant concern for 
the modern warfare.  
The current sophistication level of the cyber weapons poses critical threats to society. Particularly 
developed countries that have high dependence on information and communication technologies are 
potential targets since the safety of the critical infrastructures like; healthcare, oil and gas production, 
water supply, transportation and telecommunication count on the safety of the computer networks. 
Being aware of this fact, every nation should attach high priorities to cyber security in his agenda and 
thus behave proactively. 
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1. Introduction 
Among all centuries, a human being starting from his birth somehow got included in a group, 
community, society or nation. All these group titles, their functions and their legitimacy has changed 
throughout history; but the thing that remained the same is continual conflicts between different 
groupings, which conveyed  the concept of war. 
War is an inevitable fact of humanity. In every war, one recognizes some basic components like rising 
conditions, battlespace, weapons, strategy, tactics and consequences. Rising condition is growing 
reasons of conflict; battlespace signifies the realm of war whether it’s air, sea, or land; weapon is an 
army’s means of defence or offence; strategy can be stated as a high-level plan in order to achieve a 
defeat; and tactic is a way of using the appropriate weapons or resources to fulfill a strategy; and 
finally consequences are the victories or defeats, and effects on the opposing parties. Among these 
components, weapon is the transforming one by evolving from sword, arrow, spread to gun, rocket, 
nuclear weapons and medical weapons along the timeline. 
In the 21st century, the war concept has experienced a paradigm shift in terms of battlespace and 
weapon components. Today the new battlespace is cyber space and the contemporary weapons are 
constantly being renovated viruses, worms, trojans, denial-of-service, botnets etc. The strategy is 
being adjusted through these weapons to damage core attributes of information security using 
propaganda, espionage or destruction of critical infrastructures. The addressed security attributes are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability which is known as CIA triad. 
CIA is comprised of three criteria to evaluate information systems security (MU, 2008). The first 
criterion, confidentiality is preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, 
including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information . A loss of confidentiality 
is the unauthorized disclosure of information. Integrity is guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity. A loss 
of integrity is the unauthorized modification or destruction of information. As for availability, it is 
ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. A loss of availability is the disruption of 
access to or use of information or an information system (Evan, 2004). 
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sent to the Estonia’s deputies with “congratulations of the Victory Day”. This action resulted millions of 
letters being sent and led to mail server mainframes’ failure for 2 days. 
In the third wave , Estonia’s websites were attacked with various tools such as SQL injections (known 
vulnerabilities in Apache, PHP). Script kiddies were stoked into fervour by President Vladimir Putin’s 
speech (Afrinic-11, 2009). 
The attack heavily affected all network infrastructure; leaving damaged routers, changed routing 
tables, overloaded DNS servers, failed e-mail servers. Estonian Presidency and its Parliament, 
country’s government ministries, political parties, two biggest banks, governmental ISP, telecom 
companies experienced interoperability problems. 
After the attack, Estonia closed down the site under attack to foreign internet addresses and kept the 
sites only accessible to domestic users. 99% of bogus traffic coming from outside was cut and all “.ru” 
domain was blocked. Also, bots from DNS servers were identified and blockaded. Estonia’s Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) acted as a coordinating unit, concentrating its efforts on 
protecting the most vital resources. It persuaded ISPs around the world to blacklist attacking 
computers which overwhelmed Estonia’s bandwith (Afrinic-11, 2009). 
The methods used in this attack were not new. However, the country’s small size and high reliance on 
information and communication technologies made the attack a significant threat. As Estonia had an 
established IT infrastructure, the incident was handled appropriately before the damage was grown. 
The weapons of this case are phishing, e-mail spam, web site defacing, Syn/ICMP floods, botnets, 
DDoS which damage availability. The strategy is to test IT infrastructure and make the digital services 
temporarily down in order to retaliate for the removal of the Soviet-era memorial and prove the 
Russian power. The consequence is the access failure to the existing information systems in the 
result of availability disruption (Table 1). 
 
3. Georgia Cyberwar 
Georgia is an old Soviet Union member which is located at the crossroads of Western Asia and 
Eastern Europe with 4,7 million population (Wikipedia, 2011b). 
Statistics about the Georgian ICT sector show that Georgia has 7 Internet users per 100 people 
(UNdata, 2006). Considering the geography of the region, Georgia has few options for Internet 
connectivity via land routes, namely Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. According to some 
sources, most of Georgia is, in terms of Internet infrastructure, dependent on Russia; more of 
Georgia’s connections to the Internet pass through Russia than any other country, comprising nearly 
half of Georgia’s thirteen links to the worldwide network (Today, 2008). 
Conflict which caused the cyber attack against Georgia was started in August 2008 between Russia 
and Georgia over South Ossetia. On August 7th , Georgian forces launched a surprise attack against 
separatist forces in South Ossetia who was supported by Russia (Tikk, 2008). On August 8th , Russia 
responded to Georgia’s act by military operations into Georgian territory, which the Georgian 
authorities viewed as Russia’s military aggression against Georgia (MFAG, 2008). 
By late August 7th, before the Russian invasion into Georgia commenced, cyber attacks were already 
being launched against a large number of Georgian governmental websites(Tikk, 2008), making it 
among the first cases in which an international political and military conflict was accompanied by a 
coordinated cyber offensive. On the August 8th, the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, 
informed the international community of having begun mobilisation, and on August 9th, 2008, Georgia 
imposed a “state of war” (Saakashvili, 2008). 
The methods of these attacks primarily included defacement of public websites containing Mikheil 
Saakashvili and the National Bank; and launch of DDoS attacks against government sites, important 
media sites, financial institutions (Tikk, 2008). 
In this cyber incident, numerous targets and methods are similar to attacks used in Estonia. Several 
Russian blogs, forums, and websites spread a Microsoft Windows batch script that was designed to 
attack Georgian websites. Instructions of these downloadable scripts to ping flood Georgian 
government websites and lists of vulnerable Georgian sites were distributed on Russian websites and 
message boards. Emails of Georgian politicians were subjected to targeted attacks and spamming. 
Georgia has two main players on the Georgian Internet Access and services market; United Telecom 
and Caucasus Network. United Telecom of Georgia router was unavailable and incapable of providing 
service for several days. Caucasus Network was flooded with excessive queries. On August 9th, the 
National Bank of Georgia ordered all banks to stop offering electronic services. 
After the attack, some of the damaged websites remained online and did not really make any changes 
to defend themselves. A few of them temporarily changed their IP addresses to loop back to the 
originating network in an attempt to thwart the attacks. A few others also changed hosts. The 
websites of the Ministry of Defence and the President were relocated to Tulip Systems, Inc., located 
in Atlanta, Georgia, USA, and the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was moved to an Estonian 
server. The Office of the President of Poland provided their website for dissemination of information 
and helped to get Internet access for Georgia’s government after breakdowns of Georgian local 
servers caused by cyber attacks. CERT Poland analyzed IP data and sent out abuse messages, 
while CERT France helped with collecting log files. Security specialists from CERT Estonia also 
visited Georgia in order to assist the local CERT by providing their know-how and experience. As it’s 
apparent from the examples, international cooperation and assistance were offered, international 
awareness was raised, and media attention was drawn (Tikk, 2008). 
Although the methods used in the attack were the same as Estonia case, the density of the damage 
was higher than it. Georgia couldn’t manage the incident properly due to unsound IT infrastructure 
and high dependency on neighboring countries for internet connectivity. After all the most important 
disruption is that the timing of the cyber incidents coincided with the physical damages caused by the 
ongoing armed conflict and this situation  resulted in discredit to the authority. 
The weapons of this case are DoS, DDoS, web site defecement, TCP SYN floods, TSC RST flood 
phishing, e-mail spam which target availability attribute as was in Estonia cyber case but the intensity 
of the attacks was higher than Estonia. The strategy is to exploit unsound IT infrastructure in order to 
support the military conflict in cyberspace. All these heavy consequences occurred due to availability 
disruption (Table 1). 
 
4. Operation Aurora 
On January 12th, 2010 Google publicly disclosed that they were under a highly sophisticated and 
targeted attack on their corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of 
intellectual property from Google. It claimed that the attackers were interested in accessing Gmail 
accounts of Chinese dissidents, as well. Google was not the only victim of this attack; at least twenty 
other large companies from a wide range of business including; the internet, finance, technology, 
media and chemical sectors have been similarly targeted (Drummond, 2010). 
In Estonian and Georgian cases; cyber attacks occurred against users and after a while, they became 
aware. However, Aurora attack’s landscape is against software; which exploited a browser 
vulnerability and occurred silently without user awareness. The attack leveraged a previously 
unknown vulnerability in Internet Explorer to compromise systems at Google, Adobe and more than 
30 large companies. According to McAfee, primary goal of the attack was to gain access to and 
potentially modify source code repositories at these high tech, security and defense contractor 
companies (Kurtz, 2010). It completed its attack in six steps (McAfee, 2010): 
 A targeted user received a link in email or instant message from a “trusted” source.  
 The user clicked on the link which caused them to visit a website hosted in Taiwan that also 
contained a malicious JavaScript payload.  
 The user’s browser downloaded and executed the malicious JavaScript, which included a 
zero-day Internet Explorer (IE) exploit. 
 The exploit downloaded a binary disguised as an image from Taiwan servers and executed 
the malicious payload.  
 The payload set up a backdoor and connected to command and control servers in Taiwan.  
 As a result, attackers had complete access to internal systems. They targeted sources of 
intellectual property, including software configuration management (SCM) systems accessible 
by the compromised system. The compromised system could also be leveraged to further 
penetrate the network. 
Aurora employed an advanced persistent threat (APT) technique that proved extremely successful in 
targeting, exploiting, accessing, and exfiltrating highly valuable intellectual property from its victims 
(McAfee, 2010). APT is named by the United States Air Force analysts in 2006 in order to facilitate 
discussion of intrusion activities with their uncleared civilian counterparts (Daly, 2009). 
Advanced means the adversary is conversant with computer intrusion tools and techniques and is 
capable of developing custom exploits (Daly, 2009). 
In Aurora case, attackers gained initial access to the victim’s network with a targeted spear phishing 
attack against the company. Several employees of the victim companies received an email that 
appeared to be from someone they trusted. However, the email contained a link to a Taiwanese 
website that hosted malicious JavaScript. The malware, in turn, exploited IE vulnerability. The exploit 
triggers when IE attempts to access memory that has been partially freed. In short, sophisticated 
attackers fulfilled the advanced criterion of APT (Binde, 2011). 
Persistent means the adversary intends to accomplish a mission. They receive directives and work 
towards specific goals (Daly, 2009). 
In Aurora case, after gaining a foothold in the victim companies, the attackers employed the exploited 
workstations to compromise other internal resources. The attackers then targeted SCM systems and 
exfiltrated source code to the attacker’s command and control servers which was with innocuous-
sounding domain names such as homelinux.org, ourhobby.com and servebeer.com (Lelli, 2010). In 
January 2010, Google was the first to publicly disclose loss of intellectual property. The attackers 
accomplished a specific mission meeting the persistence criterion of APT (Binde, 2011). 
Threat means the adversary is organized, funded and motivated. Furthermore, there are objectives 
that may be political, economic (e.g., theft of intellectual property), technical or military (identification 
of weaknesses) (Daly, 2009). 
The attacks traced back to two Chinese schools, Shanghai Jiaotong University and Lanxiang 
Vocational School. Jiatong hosts one of the top computer science programs in China. In 2010, it beat 
Stanford University in an international programming competition sponsored by IBM. Lanxiang is a 
large vocational school established with military support, training some computer scientists for the 
military. The school is operated by a company with close ties to Baidu, a strong Chinese competitor to 
Google. Sources within the schools denied organizational involvement in the attacks (Markoff, 2010). 
The adversaries, whatever their actual identities, demonstrated high motivation, were adequately 
funded, and were part of a structured organization and this meets the threat criterion (Binde, 2011). 
APT is the weapon of this attack and the strategy is to exploit internet vulnerabilities in order to steal 
intellectual property and retaliate to Chinese human right activists by spying. After the incident, 
modification of source code in repositories, theft of trade secrets and unauthorized access to e-mails 
of Chinese human right activists prove the disruption of availability, confidentiality and integrity 
respectively (Table 1). 
 
5. Stuxnet Worm 
Stuxnet increased attack sophistication level when it discovered in June, 2010. Months later Iran 
confirmed that centrifuges for uranium enrichment production at Natanz were affected and potentially 
damaged by it. Stuxnet was unique and did not follow traditional Web threat patterns and tactics 
(Clare, 2011). Also, it has apparently infected over 60,000 computers, more than half of them in Iran; 
other countries affected include India, Indonesia, China, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Finland and Germany. The virus continues to spread 
and infect computer systems via the Internet, although its power to do damage is now limited by the 
availability of effective antidotes, and a built-in expiration date of 24 June 2012 (Farwell, 2011). 
Bruce Schneier’s analysis on Forbes.com suggests air-gapped Windows systems were infected by 
the Stuxnet worm via USB, that four unpublished and highly valuable zero-day vulnerabilities were 
exploited, and that Stuxnet looks for a particular model of a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) 
manufactured by Siemens, and its related controller software. Stuxnet installs its own driver in 
Windows using stolen certificates to legitimize itself, and checks back with two control servers for 
updates. It uses a peer-to-peer update scheme when it encounters itself, so the most current version 
is always utilized (Clare, 2011). 
This was an unprecedented sophisticated attack that would have wide implications for future industrial 
systems because it has broken down common beliefs about control systems security on industrial 
infrastructures. Before the Stuxnet, there was an image that control systems were safe as far as new 
USB was used for data exchange and internet was not connected; and a virus could be monitored 
thanks to abnormal behaviours of related computer (Miyachi, 2011). Additionally, it occurred at an 
extremely critical time as industrial systems move towards the adoption of Internet based 
technologies and architectures (Karnouskos, 2011b). Its main target is industrial control systems with 
the goal of modifying the code running in PLCs in order to make them deviate from their expected 
behavior (Matrosov, 2010). This deviation would be small and only noticeable over a longer period of 
time. In parallel great effort was put by the Stuxnet creators in hiding those changes from the 
operators, even imitating “legitimate” data. To increase the success rate, a vast majority of security 
holes and tools was used such as rootkits, antivirus tricking, zero-day exploits, network discovery and 
peer-to-peer updates, process injection etc. Many of these are common on modern PCs but the 
sophistication of the attack was unprecedentedly well-planned and highly customized for specific 
industrial systems. It is believed that the development of such a highly sophisticated worm was a joint-
effort with experts from different specializations and a huge investment in time and cost (Karnouskos, 
2011a). 
All of them make Stuxnet another Advanced Persistent Threat. The evidences are stated below: 
Advanced: The original infection of the Windows computer may be done via simply plugging in a USB 
flash drive or from internal network if an infected machine exists. It uses stolen certificates in order to 
legitimize itself and then installs its own driver in Windows. When it encounters itself, it uses peer-to-
peer update scheme. 
Persistent: The target was solely Siemens SCADA systems targeting very specific industrial 
processes. Stuxnet infects project files of Siemens WinCC/PC S7 SCADA control software and 
intercepts the communication between the WinCC running in Windows and the attached PLC devices 
when the two are connected via a data cable (known as “man-in-the-middle” attack). It focused on 
identifying specific slave variable frequency drives attached to the Siemens S7-300 system. 
Furthermore it has been reported that it would only attack specific provider of those PLC systems. 
However in order to have a more specialized target, it monitors the frequency of the attached motors, 
and only attacks systems that spin between a specific range. Then it installs malware on the PLC that 
monitors the Profibus of the system and under certain conditions it periodically modifies that 
frequency, which results in that the connected motors change their rotational speed. Additionally it 
has installed the first known industrial rootkit which fakes industrial process control sensor signals, 
hence no alarms or shutdown is done due to abnormal behavior. This slowly deviating behavior in 
combination with the projection of “legitimate” data results in difficulty to assess what is malfunctioning 
and to pinpoint the faults before it is too late (Karnouskos, 2011a). 
Threat: It is the first purpose-built worm designed to attack PLC, industrial control systems that help 
run critical infrastructure environments. As such, it can be hypothesized that Stuxnet was designed 
purely to attack PLCs and cause damage to the infrastructure they operate and, ultimately, to the 
people and organizations that depend on that infrastructure. Stuxnet is clearly an example of a 
stealthy worm developed by an adversary that spent a great deal of time and money on research and 
development. While the origins are still unknown, many experts feel that it was likely developed by a 
nation-state with nefarious intent driven by political rather than economic motivations (McAfee, 2011). 
Stuxnet’s design and architecture are not domain specific; it is a tool for APT. Hence with some 
modifications it could be tailored as a platform for attacking other systems e.g. in the automobile or 
power plants. Monitoring and control systems such as SCADA/DCS are responsible for managing 
critical infrastructures operate in these environments. Its highly sophisticated actions may prevent 
detection until it is too late (Karnouskos, 2011a). For Iran case, the strategy is to exploit control 
systems vulnerabilities in order to damage country reputation and avoid attribution. As a result of the 
attack Iran’s centrifuges were affected and potentially damaged and over 60,000 computers from 
other countries were infected. These happenings are indicators of availability, integrity and 
confidentiality disruption. 
By the appearance of this worm, cyber security has become a high-priority item in agendas. Barack 
OBAMA’s the following statement supports this argument: “Cybersecurity is a matter of public safety 
and national security. We count on computer networks to deliver our oil and gas, our power and our 
water, public transportation and air traffic control.” (Obama, 2009). So high dependence on 
information and communication technology brings about new hidden weapons pointed at well-
developed countries by exploiting their critical infrastructures. Stuxnet is the peak point of 
cyberweapons came. 
 
6. Discussion 
In Table 1, each war case is examined in terms of the associated war components. Considering the 
contents of the table and thus recognizing the tactical and weaponry differences, the examined war 
incidents can be divided into two groups: Estonia-Georgia and Aurora-Stuxnet respectively. In the 
former group, the main tactic is propaganda and the weapons are traditional cyber threats while in the 
latter, espionage is the common tactic and the weapons are referred as Advanced Persistent Threat.    
Both Estonia and Georgia cases stand on political disputes. Although the weapons and 
consequences are partially similar to each other, Georgia experiences higher damage because of its 
unsound IT infrastructure. These cases are references of disruption in which masses of attack are 
traceable and familiar in landscape. 
Commercial competition lies behind the Aurora case. It heats up the attack sophistication level by 
occurring silently without user awareness. Succeeding Aurora, Stuxnet is the peak point for 
cyberweapons thanks to its unprecedented attack combination and sophistication. Particularly this 
unique characteristic renders Stuxnet resistant to attribution. In both Aurora and Stuxnet cases, 
offensive parties were conversant with computer intrusion tools and techniques to accomplish a 
mission receiving directives, organized, funded, motivated for economic and political objectives 
exhibiting an Advanced Persistent Threat pattern. 
 
Table 1: General Picture of the Cases 
War  Estonia 2007 Georgia 2008 Aurora 2009 Stuxnet 2010 
Rising 
Conditions 
Political; 
elocation of a 
Soviet war 
memorial. 
Political; 
occurrance of 
Georgian surprise 
attack against 
separatist forces in 
South Ossetia. 
Global 
competition, 
political; Google’s 
internet 
domination and 
Chinese human 
right activists’ 
activities. 
Political 
Keeping Iran’s 
Uranium 
enrichment under 
control. 
Battlespace Cyberspace Land & Cyberspace Cyberspace Cyberspace 
Weapons DoS and DDoS, 
defacement, e-
mail and comment 
spam, Some 
targeted hacks 
using 
exploits/SQL 
injections. 
DoS and DDoS, 
defacement, TCP 
SYN floods, TCP 
RST flood. 
Advanced 
Persistent Threat. 
Advanced 
Persistent Threat. 
Goal Retaliate for the 
removal of the 
Soviet-era 
memorial, prove 
the Russian 
power. 
Support the military 
conflict in 
cyberspace. 
Steal intellectual 
property, retaliate 
to Chinese 
human right 
activists. 
Damage 
reputation, avoid 
attribution. 
Strategy Test IT 
infrastructure, 
make the digital 
services 
temporarily down. 
Exploit unsound IT 
infrastructure. 
Exploit internet 
vulnerabilities. 
Exploit control 
systems 
vulnerabilities. 
Tactics Propaganda. Propaganda. Espionage. Espionage. 
Consequences The disruption of 
access to related 
web sites and use 
of information of 
e-mail servers, 
bank system and 
telecom system 
occurred. 
(Availability 
disruption). 
The disruption of use 
of information of e-
mail servers, bank 
system and telecom 
system government 
sites, important 
media sites, financial 
institutions occurred. 
Higher intensity 
attacks compared to 
Estonia. 
(Availability 
disruption). 
Modify source 
code in 
repositories, steal 
trade secrets and 
read e-mails of 
chinese human 
right activists 
(Availability, 
confidentiality 
and integrity 
disruption). 
Iran’s centrifuges 
were affected and 
potentially 
damaged, 
infected over 
60,000 computers 
from other 
countries,too. 
(Availability, 
confidentiality and 
integrity 
disruption). 
 
7. Conclusion 
War is an inevitable fact of humanity. In the 21st century, the war concept has experienced a paradigm 
shift in terms of battlespace and weapon components. Today the new battlespace is cyber space and 
the contemporary weapons are constantly being renovated viruses, worms, trojans, denial-of service, 
botnets etc. Its current strategy is being adjusted through these weapons to damage core attributes of 
information security using propaganda, espionage or destruction of critical infrastructures. 
This study aims to cover Estonia Attack, Georgia Attack, Operation Aurora and Stuxnet Worm cases 
to put some evidences to the evolution of weapons of cyber war and their effects to security attributes.  
The presented cyber attack cases are the important instances of the past five years. Most of the cyber 
weapons are not new in information technology but their unprecedented combination and 
sophistication have threatened well-developed countries in the matter of exploiting. 
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